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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Appellant Fox Test Prep asserts that there is no parent corporation and there 
is no publicly held corporation that owns ten percent or more of its stock. 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 3 of 59
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
... TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ill 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................................................................... 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS ........................................... 3 
A . Facebook's Pay-Per-Click Advertising Model ..................................... 5 
B . Interactive Advertising Bureau Standards ............................................ 7 
C . Facebook's Click-Measurement Process .............................................. 8 
D . The Proceedings Below ...................................................................... -13 
1 . Predominance ............................................................................ 15 
a . Breach of Contract ......................................................... 15 
b . Injury ............................................................................... 18 
2 . Adequacy .................................................................................. 19 
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................... -20 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 21 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... -25 
I . THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY RESOLVED THE 
ISSUE OF PREDOMINANCE UNDER RULE 23(b) BY 
PREMATURELY DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS ....... 25 
A . Common Issues Predominate Because Adjudication of 
the Disputed Issues Would Resolve the Claims of Every 
Class Member .......................................................................... -26 
B . The District Court Wrongly Rejected Plaintiffs' Claims 
on the Merits ............................................................................. 31 
1 . Breach of Contract .......................................................... 32 
2 . Injury ............................................................................... 36 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 4 of 59
I1 . THE DISTRICT COURT'S ALTERNATIVE HOLDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE INADEQUATE CLASS 
REPRESENTATIVES FAILS FOR MULTIPLE. 
INDEPENDENT REASONS .............................................................. 42 
A . The Evidence Showed a Concrete Injury ................................. 42 
B . Plaintiffs Were Not Subject to "Unique" Defenses .................. 43 
C . Diversity is not a Factor Under Rule 23(a) ............................... 44 
D . Fox Had Sufficient Knowledge of the Case ............................. 44 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... -46 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 47 
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES .................................................................. -48 
DECLARATION OF SERVICE 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 5 of 59
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Alaslca Elec. Pension Fund v. FlowSe~ve Corp., 
572 F.3d 221(5th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 28 
Allapattah Sew., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 
333 F.3d 1248 (1 lth Cir. 2003) ..................................................................... 30 
Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 
......................................................................... 800 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2010) 38 
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsov, 
521 U.S. 591 (1997) ....................................................................................... 27 
Badie v. Bank ofAm., 
67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998) .......................................................................... 36 
Biancur v. Hickey, 
No. C-95-2145, 1997 WL 9857 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1997) ............................. 45 
Buckley v. C.A. Terhune, 
441 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... 36 
Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 
............................................................................. 45 Cal. 2d 474 (1 955) 3 35 
Chambevlan v. F o ~ d  Motor Co., 
402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005) ......................................................................... 20 
Daubevt v. Merrell Dow Pharnzs., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993) ....................................................................................... 38 
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 201 1) ............................................................. 27,29,40 
Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 
626 F.2d 73 1 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... 34 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 6 of 59
Evon v. Law Ofices of Sidney Mickell, 
688 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 20, 33 
Ewert v. eBay, Inc., 
C-07-02 198 RMW, C-07-04487-RMW, 
2010 WL 4269259 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) ............................................... 36 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 
452 U.S. 89 (1981) ......................................................................................... 21 
Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 
976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................... 28 
In re Conseco Life Insur. Mktg. Litig., 
270 F.R.D. 529 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .................................................................. 46 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 28 
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 
47 1 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 28 
In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 
247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ..................................................................... 44 
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 
678 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 28 
Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., 
........................ No. C 93-7709, 1996 WL 164427 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1996) 45 
London Mkt. Insurers v. Super. Ct., 
146 Cal. App. 4th 648 (2007) ........................................................................ 33 
Marsu, B. V. v. The Walt Disney, Co., 
185 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1999) ......................................................................... 41 
Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 
669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 28 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 7 of 59
Moeller v. Taco Bell Co7.p.) 
220 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Cal. 2004) .................................................................. 45 
Molski v. Gleich, 
3 18 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 44 
Nat '1 Coal. of 7-Eleven Franchisees v. The Southland Corp., 
210 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 30 
Nedlloyd Lines B. V. v. Super. Ct., 
3 Cal. 4th 459 (1 992) ..................................................................................... 3 1 
Ritti v. U-Haul Int '1, Inc., 
No. 05-4182, 2006 WL 11 17878 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2006) .......................... 44 
Rodrnan v. Safeway, Inc., 
No. C 11-03003 JSW, 201 1 WL 5241 113 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1,201 1) ........... 35 
Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Hunzana Militay Healthcave Sew., Inc., 
601 F.3d 1159 (1 1th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................... 30 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 
618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 27 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) ................................................................................... 20 
Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 
323 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 30 
Svail v. Village of Lisle, 
249 F.R.D. 544 (N.D. 111. 2008) .................................................................... 41 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 
667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 201 1) .......................................................................... 28 
Toll Bros. v. Chang Su-0 Lin, 
448 F. App'x 771 (9th Cir. 201 1) .................................................................. 34 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 8 of 59
Tourgenzan v. Collins Fin. Sews., 
NO. 08-CV- 1392 JLS (NLS), 
201 1 WL 5025152 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 201 1) ................................................ 43 
United States v. Pansier, 
576 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................... 38 
United Steel Workers v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
593 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................... 26, 28 
Vedachalanz v. Tata Consultancy Sew., Ltd., 
No. C 06-0963 CW, 2012 WL 11 10004 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012) ............... 3 1 
Val-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dulzes, 
13 1 S. Ct. 2541 (201 1) ............................................................................p assim 
Williams v. Oberon Media, Inc., 
CV 09-8764-JFW AGRX, 
2010 WL 8453723 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010) ............................................... 43 
Walsh .v. Ford Motor Co., 
807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..................................................................... 28 
Wolf v. Super. Ct., 
1 14 Cal. App. 4th 1343 (2004) ...................................................................... 34 
Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 
617 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 21 
Woods v. Google, Inc., 
No. 05:ll-cv-1263-JF, 201 1 WL 3501403 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,2001) ........ 35 
Yolzoyama v. Midland Nat'l L fe Ins. Co., 
594 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 21 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. 8 1332(d) ................................................................................................... 2 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 9 of 59
Cal . Bus . & Prof . Code 5 5 17200. et seq ................................................................ 13 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ................................................................. passim 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
...................................................... Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 20 (1981) 34 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 2 1 l(2) (1 98 1) ............................................... 36 
..................................... Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 5 2 12. 2 14(c) (1 98 1) -33 
vii 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 10 of 59
INTRODUCTION 
The district court went astray by misunderstanding its task at the class 
certification stage: It confused whether Plaintiffs-Appellants Fox Test Prep and 
Steven Price ("Plaintiffs") demonstrated the existence of common issues with 
Plaintiffs' ability to prevail on those issues. That fundamental error resulted in a 
misapplication of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Facebook, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Facebook") 
breached a uniform contract with its advertisers. The district court concluded that 
Plaintiffs failed to prove the breach in their class certification motion and, 
primarily on that basis, denied certification. However, class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires an evidentiary showing that common issues predonzinate- 
not proof that Plaintiffs will ultimately be successful on these issues. Whether 
Facebook breached the uniform contract here is the common, indeed the 
predominant, issue that will be determined by the same proof for Plaintiffs and all 
proposed class members. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown that certification is 
appropriate because the common issues will "generate common answers apt to 
drive the resolution of the litigation." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 13 1 S. Ct. 
2541,255 1 (20 1 1). Accordingly, the decision below should be reversed. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 5 1332(d) 
over this action asserting claims under California statutory and common law. This 
is a class action in which the members of the proposed class and Facebook are 
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds five million 
dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. On April 13, 2012, the district court entered 
an order denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. ER 1.l 
Plaintiffs petitioned this Court on April 27, 2012 for leave to appeal the 
district court's denial of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f) on the ground that the decision was manifestly erroneous. In an order issued 
by Chief Judge Kozinski and Judge Thomas, this Court granted the petition. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. In holding that Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim is not appropriate 
for class certification, did the district court err by (a) denying a class certification 
motion based on Plaintiffs' likelihood of success of prevailing on the merits of 
their claim, and (b) failing to consider relevant evidence of the contract's meaning 
from context, trade usage, and the duty of good faith under California law? 
"ER -" refers to Plaintiffs' Excerpts of Record, concurrently filed 
herewith. 
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2. Did the district court err in holding that the Plaintiffs would not be 
adequate representatives of the proposed class? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS 
This is a contractual dispute between Facebook and a proposed class of 
advertisers over the meaning of the word "click" in Facebook's form advertising 
contract. 
Facebook's contract does not expressly define the term "click" or the types 
of clicks for which advertisers will be billed. ER 66, 93-101, 1379-80. It is, 
however, understood in the Internet advertising industry that not every click on an 
advertisement should be billed to the advertiser. ER 736. Like owners of other 
major ad-hosting websites, Facebook tracks clicks on every advertisement by using 
proprietary algorithms that it has developed for its advertising business. These 
algorithms are essentially a compilation of computerized rules for determining 
which clicks are "valid" and which ones are "invalid." ER 790. The rules, which 
are not publicly disclosed, are purportedly designed to screen for objective 
characteristics of a click that demonstrate if a click is from a Facebook user 
intending to view an advertisement. ER 762-63. If the rules determine that a 
particular click is valid because it does indicate such intent, it is automatically 
billed to the advertiser. If, on the other hand, the click is determined to be invalid 
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because, for example, it comes fiom a single user who over a very short time 
interval clicks repeatedly, the advertiser is charged only for the initial click. 
Facebook's website assures advertisers that its rules do not permit charging 
for invalid clicks. ER 397. However, contrary to industry practice and those 
promises, Plaintiffs and the proposed class have been charged for such clicks. The 
crux of Plaintiffs' claims is that Facebook, alone among major websites, 
implemented a secret policy of maximizing advertising revenue by charging 
advertisers for demonstrably invalid clicks. On the merits, this case turns on 
whether Facebook has exercised its contractual discretion to determine click rules 
reasonably and in good faith, or whether Facebook has abused it and programmed 
its rules to enhance revenue at the expense of its advertisers. 
Despite arising in the context of electronic commerce on the Internet, the 
legal issues before the district court were no different than a contract dispute 
involving a tangible product in the bricks-and-mortar world. Imagine, for 
example, a group of apple purchasers who sign form contracts to buy apples fiom 
an orchard with the understanding that the orchard will exercise discretion to select 
the apples and the purchasers will buy them without inspection. If the purchasers 
alleged that the orchard's apple-pickers selected inedible apples and the evidence 
showed that they used the same criteria for making that selection regardless of the 
particular buyer, then a group of apple purchasers could proceed with a breach-of- 
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contract claim on a class-wide basis because the evidence necessary to prove 
whether the orchard breached the contract will be the same for purchasers. 
Similarly, this case is a breach of contract action involving a form contract-only 
here the dispute is not over the criteria used to pick apples, but over the rules 
Facebook uses to determine valid "clicks" for Internet advertising. 
A. Facebook's Pay-Per-Click Advertising Model 
Facebook is the owner of a popular social-networking website, which 
derives a significant portion of its revenue from the sale of advertising. ER 713. 
Much of this advertising is sold pursuant to a "pay-per-click" model, under which 
advertisers agree to pay for the ads based on the number of users who click on a 
displayed advertisement on the Facebook website. ER 828, n.1 Advertisers can 
purchase pay-per-click advertising either by using standardized, automated 
contracting process on Facebook7s website, or through advertising agencies and 
other intermediaries that interact with Facebook personnel. The former group is 
referred to as "self-service" advertisers; the latter as "direct" advertisers. ER 81, 
83. Facebook charges both groups the same rates using the same formula for 
determining valid clicks regardless of their size, industry, or any other 
distinguishing characteristic. ER 1378-80. 
Although the contract provides that a "click" on an advertisement obligates 
advertisers (both self-service and direct) to pay Facebook, that term is not defined 
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in Facebook's contract. ER 66, 93-101, 1379-80. Instead, Facebook follows the 
industry practice of charging advertisers only for clicks it determines in its 
discretion to be "valid" or "legitimate." ER 761. Facebook uses the term 
"legitimate" synonymously with "valid." ER 793. This well-established practice 
recognizes that clicks should be billed only when they reflect the intent of a user to 
view an advertisement. ER 736. As Facebook explains in the "Help Center" pages 
on its website, it distinguishes between clicks that its counts and ones that it will 
ultimately charge to advertisers. The "Glossary of Ad Terms" promise advertisers 
that: 
Clicks are counted each time a user clicks through your ad . . . 
We have a variety of measures in place to ensure that we only report 
and charge advertisers for legitimate clicks, and not clicks that come 
from automated programs, or clicks that may be repetitive, abusive, or 
otherwise inauthentic. 
ER 397 (emphasis added). 
To determine the legitimacy of clicks, Facebook and all other major sellers 
of pay-per-click advertising use algorithmic-based "rules" that classify clicks 
automatically in real time. ER 790. These algorithms, known in the industry as 
click "filters," are computer programs that screen for objectively recognizable 
indicia of user intent to determine whether each click was the result of a visitor 
intending to view an advertisement. ER 762-63. Pay-per-click sellers keep secret 
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the rules contained in their algorithms to protect them from manipulation, evasion, 
or fraud. ER 828-29. 
B. Interactive Advertising Bureau Standards 
The opacity inherent in the pay-per-click industry necessarily means 
advertisers have no way to independently verify that websites like Facebook are 
not charging them for invalid clicks. ER 738, 1150. However, at the core of this 
bargain between a buyer and seller of digital advertising is the assumption in the 
industry that pay-per-click sellers will exercise reasonable discretion by adopting 
click rules in good faith that are "fairly implemented with the sole objective of 
protecting advertisers from being charged for illegitimate clicks." ER 829 
(emphasis in original). In other words, the pay-per-click industry expects that 
websites like Facebook will not bias their rules or exploit the secrecy of the click 
determination process to advertisers7 detriment. Id. 
To provide formality and consistency to this nascent business model, the 
online advertising industry's self-regulatory governing body-the Interactive 
Advertising Bureau ("IABV)-established standards for "the minimum acceptable 
[click] counting procedures."2 The IAB is made up of leading media and 
technology companies, who collectively are responsible for selling almost 90% of 
2 http://www.iab.net/clickmeasurementguidelines (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
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online advertising in the United States. ER 313-14. In 2009, the IAB membership 
unanimously approved voluntary standards (or "guidelines," as the terms are used 
interchangeably in the industry) for determining what should be considered a 
legitimate, and thus billable, click. ER 312. The IAB also approved standards 
regarding the use of third-party audits to validate the members' proprietary click 
determinations. ER 328-29, 739. Facebook, which is currently on the IAB's Board 
of Directors, was one of those approving members. ER 545, 734, 1 15 1, 1 157. 
At the heart of the IAB standards is its provision for third-party auditing of 
click-measurement systems, which the IAB considers "critical to ensuring 
consistency and trust" in the industry. ER 835. The audit standard arose in large 
part from the industry's recognition that the only effective check on a proprietary 
pay-per-click measurement process is third-party validation. ER 328-30, 835-36. 
All of Facebook's principal competitors for pay-per-click advertising- 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!-follow the IAB auditing standards and submit to 
independent, third-party audits to certify their compliance with the IAB standards 
for click measurement. ER 540, 1202, 1233. 
C. Facebook's Click-Measurement Process 
Like other pay-per-click sellers, Facebook does not negotiate with or 
disclose to advertisers the specific algorithmic programming rules that it uses to 
determine which clicks it considers valid. Facebook tells advertisers "we're not 
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able to give you more specific information" about these algorithms "[dlue to the 
.Facebook does not provide those 
details to advertisers even when it is asked about a particular charge. ER 1023-24. 
Such steadfast refusals have prompted advertisers to complain to Facebook 
customer support about Facebook's blanket "trust us" mantra. ER 1036 ("So 
basically what you're telling me is that the official Facebook advertising policy is 
'Just give us your money and trust us because we refuse to give you any 
information'? . . . when I try to find out what your policies are, your response boils 
down to 'It's a secret. "'). 
The secrecy of Facebook's procedures requires advertisers to grant 
Facebook contractual discretion to write its click-validity rules reasonably and in 
good faith. Understanding this grant, Facebook assures advertisers that it exercises 
its discretion in a manner consistent with its obligation. The company's online 
"Help Center" claims that "Facebook takes a proactive approach to protect you 
from invalid clicks" and is "constantly improving our systems to identify invalid 
activity." ER 15. 
Unlike its major competitors, however, Facebook chooses not to follow IAB 
standards, including the critical audit requirement. ER 1046, 1 155, 1 170. 
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Thus, no third party has ever evaluated and tested 
Facebook's processes for determining valid clicks or whether its systems are in 
compliance with industry standards. 
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D. The Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs are website operators who separately entered into pay-per-click 
advertising contracts with Facebook after reviewing the advertising information 
about Facebook's policies on its website. ER 453, 499. After independently 
monitoring the visits to their websites originating from Facebook, both Plaintiffs 
suspected that Facebook was charging them for invalid clicks. ER 450 at 9-1 1, 502 
at 7-12. As a result, they stopped advertising on Facebook (ER 491 at 18-22, 469 
at 3-5), and filed separate class action lawsuits, later consolidated, in the Northern 
District of California. ER 669. Plaintiffs' consolidated complaint alleges claims 
under California law for (1) breach of express contract and of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) unfair, unlawful, and fi-audulent business 
practices, in violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code $ 5  
17200, et seq. ("UCL"). ER 58 1, 647. 
Facebook moved to dismiss, citing a purported disclaimer of liability for 
claims "in connection with any third part[y] click fraud or other improper actions 
that may occur." ER 647-49. The district court, in an opinion by Judge Fogel, 
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granted the motion in part and denied it in part, granting Plaintiffs leave to amend. 
ER 656. Specifically, the court held that Plaintiffs stated claims for breach of 
contract, violations of the UCL, and for declaratory relief. ER 656. 
After Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Complaint ("FAC"), 
Facebook again moved to dismiss and the district court again granted the motion in 
part and denied it in part. ER 610. Judge Fogel rejected Facebook's argument that 
the disclaimer provided a blanket protection from liability, explaining that it 
shielded Facebook only from a subset of "invalid" clicks known as "click fraud" 
(i.e., clicks intended to defi-aud either the advertiser or Facebook). All other types 
of invalid clicks were not, according to Judge Fogel, covered by the disclaimer. ER 
616-21. 
In September 201 1, Plaintiffs moved for certification of the following 
proposed class: "All persons or entities in the United States who paid money to 
Facebook, Inc. for cost-per-click advertising during the period of May 2009 to the 
present." ER 6. 
Judge Phyllis Hamilton, to whom the case had been transferred after full 
briefing of the class certification motion, denied Plaintiffs' motion. ER 23-24. The 
3 The court also ruled that the independent claim for breach of the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing was superfluous in light of its holding that 
Plaintiffs had stated a valid claim for breach of contract. ER 65 1. 
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court held that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23's class-certification requirements 
for two reasons: (1) issues common to the class do not predominate as required by 
Rule 23(b)(3), and (2) the named plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives, 
as required by Rule 23(a). 
1. Predominance. The district court's primary rationale, to which it 
devoted the bulk of its reasoning, was that Plaintiffs failed to show that common 
issues of fact and law predominated over individual issues as required by Rule 
23(b)(3), and thus requiring Facebook's advertisers to bring individual actions 
would be a superior procedure "for the fair and efficient adjudication of the case." 
ER 24. The court advanced a variety of reasons for this conclusion, but all of them 
are closely intertwined with and provide support for the court's view that Plaintiffs 
had failed to prove the viability of their claims. 
a. Breach of Contract. The court first weighed in on Facebook's 
liability for breach of contract. Because Facebook's pay-per-click advertising 
contract does not expressly define the word "click" to exclude clicks demonstrably 
unrelated to an expression of interest in an advertisement, the court held that the 
Plaintiffs had "failed to establish" that such a requirement was "part of any 
contract." ER 14. Without explaining the relationship between that conclusion and 
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the court held that certification was 
inappropriate because "common questions do not predominate with regard to the 
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critical issue of whether Facebook performed its obligations under [its advertising] 
contract." ER 18. 
The court acknowledged that Facebook's online contract links to a page in 
its "Help Center," in which the Company assures advertisers that it screens out and 
does not charge for invalid clicks. ER 14-15. But the court considered that 
statement to be irrelevant because "[n]owhere on this page does Facebook promise 
that advertisers will never be billed for an 'invalid' click, nor that Facebook will be 
able to identify and screen out every 'invalid' click." ER 15 (emphasis added). The 
court also declined to consider Facebook's assurance in the Help Center's glossary 
that it will only charge advertisers for "legitimate clicks." ER 15-16. The court 
reasoned that, because there is no direct link to the glossary included in Facebook's 
online contract it correctly ignored it in interpreting Facebook's contractual 
obligations. ER 15- 16. Thus, the court concluded, "plaintiffs have not established 
that these additional terms were part of what the advertisers and Facebook agreed 
to at the time of contracting." ER 14. 
As a matter of California contract law, the court also rejected Plaintiffs' 
reliance on evidence of the online advertising industry's settled understanding of 
the word "click" for purposes of billing under a pay-per-click contract. ER 16. The 
word's usage in trade, the court wrote, "appear[s] nowhere in the documents that 
could reasonably be considered to comprise the contract." ER 17. And because 
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Facebook's advertising contract purported to exclude additional terms, the court 
held that it could not consider interpretative evidence of the contract's text. ER 16. 
The court did not address Plaintiffs' argument that, as the only party to the contract 
with knowledge and control over its algorithms, Facebook had a duty to apply 
them reasonably and in good faith. 
In the only portion of the decision in which the district court identified an 
issue related to the suitability of Plaintiffs' claims for class treatment-the key 
question under Rule 23(b)-the court held that "individual assessments will be 
required to determine the parties' intent" at the time of contract formation. ER 17- 
18. The court considered it "highly likely that many members of the proposed class 
would never have reviewed the material on the Help Center pages," and that even 
class members who did read the pages may have reached differing interpretations 
about the meaning of "click." ER 17. Despite its conclusion in the previous 
paragraph of its opinion that Facebook's contractual obligations could not be 
altered with extrinsic evidence, the court held that a decision on Plaintiffs' claims 
would require consideration of Plaintiffs' individual understanding of the 
contract's meaning. ER 18. The court did not, however, state whether other issues 
suitable for common adjudication predominated over the individualized one it 
identified. ER 1 6- 17. 
Case: 12-16601     02/25/2013          ID: 8524578     DktEntry: 24     Page: 27 of 59
b. Injury. After doubting Plaintiffs' ability to prove that Facebook 
breached the contract, the district court devoted the remainder of its predominance 
discussion focusing on two difficulties it foresaw relating to Plaintiffs' ability to 
prove injury from a breach. 
First, the court identified Plaintiffs' "method of distinguishing between 
'valid' and 'invalid' clicks" as an "area in which individualized questions 
predominate." ER 18. Plaintiffs' expert witness on the issue of a common 
methodology for proving liability and damages, Dr. Markus Jakobsson, testified 
that he was prepared to rewrite the click algorithms and apply them to Facebook's 
historical database of clicks-the same data on which Facebook had previously 
relied in determining that the clicks were valid. ER 18. But the court was instead 
"persuaded, based on the analysis of Facebook's expert," that "there is no way" 
that Dr. Jakobsson's methodology-which, at the class-certification stage, had not 
yet been actually implemented-could be used for such "highly specialized and 
individualized analysis for each of the thousands of advertisers in the proposed 
class." ER 18. Plaintiffs thus could not, the court held, prove common injury from 
a breach of Facebook's contract. ER 19-20. The court did not articulate why it was 
persuaded by Facebook's expert analysis nor did it explain what was "specialized" 
or "individualized" about the click determination process that precluded a finding 
of compliance with Rule 23(b). Id. 
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Second, the court concluded that an additional "individualized assessment" 
would be "required to determine damages." ER 19. The court supported its 
conclusion by noting that Dr. Jakobsson had "conceded in his deposition" that 
classifying past clicks based on historical data about those clicks would inevitably 
lead to some false positives "in which damages could be awarded for 'valid' 
clicks." ER 19. Recognizing the "general rule" that "the need for individualized 
damages, alone, cannot defeat class action treatment," the court nevertheless held 
that the "difficulty of determining injury on a classwide basis" justified that result 
here. ER 19-20. The court did not examine, however, whether injury would be 
easier to determine if individual Facebook advertisers were required to bring 
separate claims. ER 19. 
2. Adequacy. The district court also briefly addressed Rule 23(a)(4)'s 
adequacy requirement, holding that the Plaintiffs should be disqualified as class 
representatives under the meaning of that rule. ER 10. The court found the 
Plaintiffs to be inadequate representatives under Rule 23(a)(4) because, among 
other reasons, they were subject to unique defenses and failed to show "any 
concrete injury from specific 'invalid' clicksy'-although Plaintiffs' expert 
testimony established that Facebook charged them a fee for such clicks. ER 10-1 1. 
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Arguing that the district court's denial of certification was manifestly 
erroneous, Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for permission to appeal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). See Chanzberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952. 
959, 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that discretionary appeals under Rule 23(f) are 
appropriate when "the district court's class certification decision is manifestly 
erroneous," i.e., where the court "applies an incorrect Rule 23 standard"). Chief 
Judge Kozinski and Judge Thomas granted the petition, and this appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To establish entitlement to class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions. First, the case must satisfy 
the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a), i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation. Evon v. Law Ofices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 101 5, 
1028 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 130 S. Ct. 143 1, 1437 (201 0)). Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least 
one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs here rely on Rule 
23(b)(3), which applies when ccquestions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and when a 
class action would be "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy." Id. 
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This Court reviews a district court's application of Rule 23's factors for 
abuse of discretion, and factual findings made in support of that application for 
clear error. Yolcoyawza v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 109 1 (9th Cir. 
2010). Although tlie Court's review of the district court's decision is accordingly 
deferential, the district court's discretion is nonetheless "bounded by the relevant 
provisions of tlie Federal Rules." Gulfoil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 (1981). 
A district court thus errs when its decision is not "consistent with the policies of 
Rule 23." Id. A district court also commits reversible error when "it relies upon an 
improper factor, omits consideration of a factor entitled to substantial weight, or 
mulls the correct mix of factors but makes a clear error of judgment in assaying 
them." Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 
201 0) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Finally, "it is also true that [this Court] accords the decisions of district 
courts no deference when reviewing their determinations of questions of law." 
Yokoyanza, 594 F.3d at 1091. In that case, "the error of law is an abuse of 
discretion. " Id. (emphasis in original). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1.a The decision below held that this case cannot be certified as a class 
action because issues common to the class do not predominate over individualized 
ones under Rule 23(b)(3). The district court's reasons for reaching that result, 
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however, have nothing to do with a predominance analysis. Rather, the court's 
reasoning leaped to a merits determination finding Plaintiffs could not prove that 
Facebook breached its contracts with class members and that the class cannot show 
damages for a breach. Simply put, the court adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims on the 
merits before they had the opportunity to present evidence on their claims. That 
was error. 
It is now well settled that Rule 23 requires district courts to conduct a 
rigorous analysis of Plaintiffs' claims at the class certification stage, but the scope 
of the court's inquiry does not encompass a decision on the ultimate merits. 
Rather, it is limited to evaluating those aspects of the merits that actually bear on 
the requirements for certification under Rule 23. Despite the need for a rigorous 
analysis, class certification is still not the proper stage for district courts to evaluate 
the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their claims. 
Here, Plaintiffs met Rule 23's requirements by showing that their claims 
depended on an interpretation of Facebook's online form contract and its 
algorithms for determining "valid" clicks, both of which are materially uniform as 
to all members of the class. The district court's holding does nothing to undermine 
that conclusion. To the contrary, the court's reasons for holding that Plaintiffs' 
claims lack merit, even if correct, would apply equally to all class members. Either 
way, Plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within the definition of "common issues" 
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recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes-namely, those 
issues with the "capacity . . . to generate common answers" as to all class members 
"in one stroke." Id., 13 1 S. Ct. at 2551. 
1.b The district court's decision on the merits was not only procedurally 
improper, but also substantively wrong. Although this Court need not repeat the 
district court's error by deciding the merits, Plaintiffs set out the district court's 
errors in detail so that the Court has a clear understanding of why the underlying 
case lends itself to class certification and a subsequent adjudication of the 
underlying allegations. 
(1) The district court held that Facebook's online contract did not 
limit the charges for "clicks" in the manner Plaintiffs suggested. ER 17. But in 
reaching that conclusion, the court ignored Plaintiffs' evidence that the use of that 
term in Facebook's contract, its use in trade, and the course of dealing between 
Facebook and its advertisers all provide contextual meaning to an otherwise 
undefined contractual term. In doing so, the court erred under California law. 
The district court's analysis further ignored a central principle of Plaintiffs' 
contract claim-that while Facebook has discretion to determine click validity, it is 
bounded by its duty to act reasonably and in good faith. By failing to consider 
Facebook's overarching contractual duty, the district court implicitly concluded 
that Facebook's contract allows it to manipulate its algorithms to charge 
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advertisers for clicks that are objectively invalid. That is an unreasonable reading 
of both the contract itself and California law. 
(2) The decision below also wrongly held that Plaintiffs could not 
show injury or damages. Without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the court 
concluded that "there was no way" that Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Markus 
Jakobsson, could distinguish between valid and invalid clicks, or between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent clicks. ER 19. This conclusion was reached by 
ignoring Dr. Jakobsson's testimony that, based on his decades of experience and 
expertise as a computer scientist, one could do exactly that. ER 755. The court's 
one-sentence dismissal of an esteemed expert provided neither the analysis nor 
evidence that a Daubevt determination would have required had the court decided 
to conduct such an inquiry. Moreover, it failed to provide even the minimum of 
reasoning necessary to support appellate review. 
Even setting aside the impropriety of the district court's determination of 
the merits at the class certification stage, the court's conclusion was clearly wrong. 
Distinguishing between valid and invalid clicks is precisely what Facebook and 
other major Internet companies must do to operate their pay-per-click business. 
Indeed, Plaintiffs' expert proposed to rely on the same set of data that Facebook 
used when it initially decided which clicks it would bill to Plaintiffs. ER 756-57. 
The court's conclusion that "there [is] no way" Dr. Jakobsson could have 
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performed the same exercise was therefore manifestly erroneous. The court's 
related conclusion, that Dr. Jakobsson's calculations of damages would inevitably 
include false positives, suffered from similar shortcomings. In any event, the need 
to calculate individualized damages, as the district court itself recognized, is not a 
reason to deny class certification. 
2. Finally, the district court advanced four reasons why it believed the 
named plaintiffs to be inadequate class representatives under Rule 23(a). The 
district court's first adequacy holding borrows from its flawed discussion of 
predominance, and fails for the same reason. And the remaining reasons are wholly 
without support in either fact or law. The decision below should be reversed and 
this Court should order the class certified. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF 
PREDOMINANCE UNDER RULE 2300) BY PREMATURELY 
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS. 
The bulk of the decision below, cloaked in the parlance of predominance, 
holds that the case cannot be certified because common issues do not predominate 
over individualized ones under Rule 23 (b)(3). The decision's rationale on 
predominance, in turn, rests on two general conclusions: (1) that Plaintiffs did not 
prove that Facebook agreed to the alleged contractual terms, and (2) that they did 
not establish an injury or damages fiom the alleged breach. But the rationale is 
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hardly a rigorous analysis of predominance. Rather, even a cursory review reveals 
the court's conclusion is simply a reflection of its view that Plaintiffs failed to 
prove the merits of their claims. 
The district court's holding that individual issues predominate was based on 
impermissible criteria. This Court could not be any clearer that, "[iln determining 
the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs 
have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the 
requirements of Rule 23 are met." United Steel Wovkevs v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). By making 
this judgment at this stage, the court wrongfully denied Plaintiffs the opportunity, 
following full discovery, to present evidence on their claims to the ultimate finder 
of fact. 
A. Common Issues Predominate Because Adjudication of the 
Disputed Issues Would Resolve the Claims of Every Class 
Member. 
As the Supreme Court recently explained in Wal-Mart v. Dulces, the 
"common issues" that must predominate under Rule 23 are those issues of fact or 
law "capable of classwide resolution." Id., 13 1 S. Ct. at 2551. So long as a case has 
the "capacity . .. to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 
litigation3'-so long, in other words, as the questions are capable of being resolved 
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as to all class members "in one stroke',-Dukes establishes that interests of fairness 
and efficiency require certification. Id. 
The decision below turns Dukes on its head. Ignoring this Court's recent 
admonition that, to the extent the merits do not bear upon class certification issues, 
they should not be considered, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 
(9th Cir. 201 I), the court rested its holding on its conclusion that Plaintiffs had not, 
in their motion for class certification, proved the elements of their claims. But even 
assuming the district court was correct that Plaintiffs' claims will ultimately fail on 
the merits-and, as explained in Part I.B, infra, it is not-the claims would fail 
equally as to all members of the class. 
The district court's rationale thus provides no basis on which to conclude 
that individualized rather than common issues predominate-the relevant question 
under Rule 23(b)(3). On the contrary, the susceptibility of a class's claims to 
rejection "in one stroke" would, if anything, support certification under Dukes. As 
Judge Easterbrook reasoned in Schleichev v. Wendt, "Rule 23 allows certification 
of classes that are fated to lose as well as classes that are sure to win." Id., 618 F.3d 
679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). 
To be sure, class certification demands a "rigorous analysis" under Rule 23 
that requires the district judge to take a "close look at the case." Anzchem Prods. 
Inc. v. Windsor, 52 1 U.S. 59 1, 6 15 (1 997) (quotations omitted). While that inquiry 
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typically ccentail[s] some overlap with the merits," Dukes, 13 1 S. Ct. at 255 1, "a 
motion for class certification is not the appropriate point at which to resolve the 
merits of a plaintiffs claim." Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 509 
(9th Cir. 1 992).4 
It is the plaintiffs theory and the type of proof necessary to support that 
theory that matters at the class certification stage. See United Steel Workers, 593 
F.3d at 808. Thus, district courts must engage in an "examin[ation] [of] the 
elements of plaintiffs' claim through the prism of Rule 23." In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 3 1 1 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the court engaged in the type of analysis 
- 
4 See also In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 
678 F.3d 409, 41 7 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Whether the class members will ultimately be 
successful in their claims is not a proper basis for reviewing a certification of a 
class action." (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Messner v. 
Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[Tlhe court 
should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial 
on the merits."); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 297, 305 (3d Cir. 201 1) 
(en banc) (Rule 23 inquiry does not address "what valid claims can plaintiffs 
assert; rather, it is simply whether common issues of fact or law predominate"); 
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 2009) 
("In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but 
rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met") (quotation omitted); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that class 
certification proceeding should not turn "into a protracted mini-trial of substantial 
portions of the underlying litigation"); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 
10 17-1 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (vacating class certification denial, concluding that 
"[c]lass action proponents may not be called upon to prove their case in order to 
obtain certification.") 
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that Costco specifically cautioned against: one that turns "class certification into a 
mini-trial" on the merits. Id., 657 F.3d at 983. 
Plaintiffs here proved all that Rule 23(b)(3) requires of them-that their 
claims on the merits for liability and damages for breach of contract and violation 
of the UCL would be adjudicated through proof overwhelming common to the 
class.5 Plaintiffs' theory of liability was that Facebook breached its contract with 
advertisers by using a set of undisclosed rules (i.e., click filters) that resulted in the 
charging for demonstrably invalid clicks-that is, clicks that do not represent valid 
expressions of interest by Facebook users to view an advertisement. In support of 
class certification, Plaintiffs introduced unrefuted evidence that Facebook's 
contracts with advertisers are materially uniform with regard to the provision at 
issue here, the determination of click validity. ER 1378 at 5-6, 1379 at 9-25, 1380 
at 3-9, 1381 at 4-21. Because form contracts are standardized by nature, courts 
routinely find claims involving such contracts ideal for class treatment. See, e.g., 
Plaintiffs' UCL claim under that statute's "unfair" prong is based on 
Facebook systematic contractual violations. ER 602. The district court's Rule 
23(b)(3) determination concerning the amenability of the UCL claim to class-wide 
adjudication flowed a fortiori from its conclusions respecting Plaintiffs' contract 
claim-namely, its view that (i) the terms that upon which Plaintiffs rely were not 
part of the contract, and (ii) there is no class-wide means of distinguishing between 
valid and invalid clicks. ER 21. Consequently, no separate discussion of that 
claim is necessary here. 
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Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Sew., Inc., 601 
F.3d 1 159, 1 17 1 (1 1 th Cir. 201 0) ("It is the form contract, executed under like 
conditions by all class members, that best facilitates class treatment."); Smilow v. 
Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (common issues of law 
and fact predominated because "[tlhe case turn[ed] on interpretation of the form 
contract, executed by all class members and defendant"). 
This case lends itself ideally for class treatment because the question at issue 
that will drive this litigation is whether Facebook's rules amounted to a breach of 
the contract's terms and its corresponding duty to interpret and apply those terms 
in good faith. See Nat '1 Coal. of 7-Eleven Franchisees v. The Southland Corp., 2 10 
F.3d 384, 384 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of contract claim, explaining 
that "[elach class member is subject to the same franchise agreement release 
provision. The interpretation of this provision ultimately is a question of law and 
can be resolved for all the class members in a single action."); Allapattah Sew., 
Inc. v. Exxon Gorp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming class 
certification where relevant agreements were materially similar; whether the duty 
of good faith was breached was a question common to the class, thus liability could 
be determined on class-wide basis). Because Facebook's rules for distinguishing 
between valid and invalid clicks are based on uniform, automated computer 
algorithms, Plaintiffs' claims do not require resolution of Facebook7s culpability 
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on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis. Thus, whether Plaintiffs win or lose, their claims 
will rise and fall together. This is precisely how Dukes articulated the common 
issue requirement. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (common question is one that 
"generate[s] common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation) (citation 
omitted). 
B. The District Court Wrongly Rejected Plaintiffs' Claims on the 
Merits. 
Even if the district court were correct to reach the merits of Plaintiffs' 
claims, it arrived at the wrong conclusions. In fact, the evidence adduced thus far 
in the litigation demonstrates a compelling case for a trial on the breach of contract 
and UCL claims. 
Under California law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the 
existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiffs performance or excuse for non- 
performance; (3) the defendant's breach; and (4) damages to the plaintiff as a result 
of the breach. See Vedachalanz v. Tata Consultancy Sew., Ltd., No. C 06-0963 
CW, 2012 WL 1110004, "1 1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012).~ The district court decided 
the first, third and fourth prongs against the Plaintiffs, holding that Facebook had 
- 
6 California law will govern the resolution of the breach of contract claim for 
Plaintiffs and the proposed class. Facebook's uniform contract with advertisers 
provides for application of California law to resolve all disputes over the 
advertising terms and conditions "without regard to choice of law principles." ER 
346. See NedlloydLines B. K v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 4th 459 (1992). 
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never agreed to charge advertisers for only valid clicks, and that, even if Plaintiffs 
could show a breach, they could not prove that they were injured by that breach or 
accurately determine the amount of damages to which they are entitled. ER 14. 
1. Breach of Contract. 
The district court fllrst erred in holding that Plaintiffs could not prove that 
Facebook breached its contract with class members. Id. The court concluded that 
Facebook was under no contractual obligation to discard clicks that were invalid 
because the company's promise to do so did not appear within the four comers of 
the agreement. ER 14-1 5. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Facebook's contract did not 
expressly articulate the criteria for what constitutes a valid (or legitimate) "click." 
But that gap in the contract does not, as the district court appeared to reason, leave 
Facebook with unbridled discretion to set the criteria as it sees fit. That the term 
does not include literally every click on an advertisement is clear both froin the 
context in which it appeared, the usage of the word in the industry and Facebook's 
course of conduct-all basic tools of contract interpretation under California law 
that the court ignored. 
First, it is undisputed that Facebook itself explained the meaning of a "click" 
in materials on its website. As an initial matter, the website pages comprising the 
contract included a link to online Facebook's "Help Center," where Facebook 
assured its advertisers that it "takes a proactive approach to protect you fi-om 
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invalid clicks." ER 15. The Help Center further explained that Facebook employs 
a system "to detect and invalidate" invalid clicks, including "[h]uman clicks that 
don't indicate a genuine interest in the ad or may be associated with . . . repetitive 
or accidental clicks." Id. Finally, the Help Center's "Glossary of Ad Terms" 
assures advertisers that while Facebook "counts" every click on an ad, it only 
"charge[s] advertisers for legitimate clicks, and not clicks that come from 
automated programs, or clicks that may be repetitive, abusive, or otherwise 
inauthentic." ER 3 97. 
Although the district court was correct that this "extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written [integrated] 
contract," Plaintiffs did not offer Facebook's website materials to modify the 
parties' obligations under the contract. Rather, its purpose was to give meaning to 
an undefined term in the contract. See London Mkt. Insurers v. Super. Ct., 146 Cal. 
App. 4th 648, 656 (2007) (evidence may be considered in determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous or whether there is any latent ambiguity under all the 
circumstances). See also Evon, 688 F.3d at 1022 (extrinsic evidence may be used 
to shed light on the meaning of language in a contract even where the contract is 
integrated) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 2 12, 2 14(c) (1 98 1)). 
Indeed, where the evidence shows that contract is "reasonably susceptible" to more 
than one meaning, "it is reversible error" under California law "for a trial court to 
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refuse to consider such extrinsic evidence on the basis of the trial court's own 
conclusion that the language of the contract appears to be clear and unambiguous 
on its face." Wolfv. Super. Ct., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 1350-51 (2004). That is 
precisely what the district court did here. 
Second, Plaintiffs introduced unrefuted evidence that industry practice and 
trade usage demonstrate that the general contours of the term "click" do not 
include billing for every click that is recorded. See Cal. Lettuce Growe7-s v. Union 
Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 482 (1955) (explaining when there is a known usage of 
the trade, persons carrying on that trade are deemed to have contracted in reference 
to the usage unless the contrary appears and that the usage forms a part of the 
contract if necessary); see also Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 
73 1, 737 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving use of expert testimony to describe the type of 
agreements customarily found in the relevant industry). 
Finally, the district court failed to consider a central component of Plaintiffs' 
theory in this case and another core pillar of California law: that in determining 
click validity, Facebook must exercise its discretion reasonably and in good faith. 
See Toll Bros. v. Chang Su-0 Lin, 448 F. App'x 771, 773 (9th Cir. 201 1) ("'Every 
contract [under California law] imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement[.]"') (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts 5 20 (1981)); Cal. Lettuce Growers, 45 Cal. 2d at 484 
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("[Wlhere a contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the 
rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in 
accordance with fair dealing."). 
Plaintiffs' theory of liability is that Facebook breached its contract with 
advertisers by writing rules that resulted in the charging for objectively invalid 
clicks-that is, clicks that do not represent a Facebook user's expression of interest 
in an advertisement. The question for trial is whether Facebook breached the 
contract's terms and Facebook's duty to interpret and apply those terrns in good 
faith. The district court's holding that Facebook's contract allows it free rein to 
determine click validity was therefore error under California law. 
Finally, the district court erred by considering whether a class member had 
knowledge of or reviewed the extrinsic evidence on Facebook's website at the time 
of contracting. ER 16. That question is irrelevant under California contract law. 
See Rod77zan v. Safeway, Inc., No. C 11-03003 JSW, 201 1 WL 5241 113, "4 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 1, 201 1) (in class action alleging breach of Internet-based coiltract, court 
found that website's "FAQ" section was relevant extrinsic evidence regarding 
terrns of online contract without regard to whether class members had specifically 
reviewed it); Woods v. Google, Inc., No. 05:ll-cv-l263-.TF, 201 1 WL 3501403, at 
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,2001) (analyzing issue of extrinsic evidence of an alleged 
breach of ail online advertising contract without reference to whether advertisers 
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read or reviewed the evidence). As this Court has explained, issues regarding a 
party's awareness or review of extrinsic evidence are immaterial because courts 
look to the objective manifestations of the parties' intent. Buckley v. C.A. Tevhune, 
441 F.3d 688, 695-96 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 
4th 779, 802 n.9 (1998) ("Although the intent of the parties determines the 
meaning of the contract, the relevant intent is objective-that is, the objective intent 
as evidenced by the words of the instrument, not a party's subjective intent") 
(internal citations omitted); Ewevt v. eBay, Inc., Nos. C-07-02198 RMW, C-07- 
04487-RMW, 2010 WL 4269259, *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining that 
when there is a standardized agreement, it is interpreted "as treating alike all those 
similarly situated, 'without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the 
standard terms of the writing."' (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
5 21 l(2) (1981)). Indeed, the district court's holding that the case would require 
inquiry into the understanding of individual parties directly contradicts its holding 
that consideration of context and industry practice cannot alter the contract's 
meaning. ER 1 8. 
2. Injury. 
In addition to wrongly holding that the Plaintiffs could not prove a breach of 
contract, the district court erred in holding that they could not prove injury or 
damages. ER 19. The district court summarily concluded-without the benefit of 
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an evidentiary hearing or in the context of a motion to strike-that the Plaintiffs 
had failed to demonstrate that there is a viable methodology for distinguishing 
between valid (or billable) and invalid (or nonbillable) clicks or between invalid 
clicks that were fraudulent and ones that were not. ER 18-19. The entirety of the 
court's rejection of Plaintiffs' expert is contained in this one-sentence conclusion: 
"The court is persuaded, based on the analysis of Facebook's expert . . . that using 
Dr. Jakobsson's methodology, there is no way to conduct this type of highly 
specialized and individualized analysis for each of the thousands of advertisers in 
the proposed class." ER 19. 
In reaching that conclusion, the district court, sua sponte, rejected the 
methodology, and ignored the deposition testimony, of Plaintiffs' expert. ER 758- 
60, 774-84. Although Dr. Jakobsson opined in his report and testified at deposition 
that he would be able to write algorithms that made the click distinctions noted 
above (ER 1396 at 77 23, 31, ER 1405 at 130:14-25)' the court stated he testified 
otherwise when that was not the case. ER 19. Moreover, the court never explained 
why it believed that Dr. Jakobsson's methodology could not distinguish between 
the different types of clicks at issue, nor did the court explain why it was persuaded 
by the opinions of Facebook's expert. Id. 
The district court's summary rejection of Dr. Jakobsson's opinions was in 
essence a Daubevt determination without an analysis of any of the evidentiary 
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factors that a court must consider in this context. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (instructing that courts must analyze, prior 
to its admissibility, whether a given expert is qualified to testify in the case in 
question and whether his testimony is relevant and scientifically reliable). As the 
Seventh Circuit recently explained, while a district court has discretion in 
determining reliability, "the [district] court must provide more than just conclusory 
statements of admissibility[.]" A772. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 800 F.3d 810, 816 
(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 
2009) (citation omitted)). The district court's conclusory rulings here failed to 
follow the Daubert mandate, or any other rigorous analytical framework. 
The method that Dr. Jakobsson describes makes use of Facebook's extensive 
archival click data and employs standard algorithmic methods to essentially 
"rewind the tape" and review all the clicks under a revised set of click rules that 
Plaintiffs claim would suffice to satisfy Facebook's obligation to discard invalid 
clicks. ER 755-58, 764-772. The result will identify the clicks for which each 
advertiser wrongfully paid and which should have been discarded had Facebook 
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employed the algorithmic rules that Dr. Jakobbson opines can be written. ER 7577 
The availability of the data permitting this analysis is undisputed, and the 
reliability of the methods Dr. Jakobsson describes is unquestioned as it mimics the 
actual methods that are employed by Facebook and others in the industry. ER 763. 
The district court's basis for rejecting this methodology was its conclusion 
that Dr. Jakobsson had not identified the precise algorithmic rules that he would 
employ. ER 18. Dr. Jakobsson was not, however, proffered as an expert in 
determining the specific contours of these rules.' Rather, he was proffered instead 
to opine whether a set of objective algorithmic rules, different from the ones 
8 Another one of Plaintiffs' experts, Kevin Lee, was proffered as an expert 
on that subject. A participant in the drafting of the IAB standards, Mr. Lee opined 
on the proper standards for click measurement without any objection from 
Facebook or a counter report disputing his opinions. ER 732-40. 
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Facebook employed, could be written and then applied to Facebook's historical 
data to permit a retroactive computation. 
The court rejected Dr. Jakobsson's methodology because the district court 
believed, without the benefit of scientific evidence to support its view, that "there 
was no way" one could devise rules that distinguish between valid and invalid 
clicks. ER 19. This is a wholly improper basis to reject expert testimony under 
Daubevt in the absence of scientific or other types of empirical support. As this 
Court noted in Costco, ccDaubevt does not require a court to admit or to exclude 
evidence based on its persuasiveness; rather it requires a court to admit or exclude 
evidence based on its scientific reliability and relevance." Cotsco, 657 F.3d at 982. 
The court failed to apply this evidentiary standard. 
Contrary to the district court's finding, Dr. Jakobsson expressly opined in 
detail in his opening report, and confirmed in his rebuttal report, that he could 
devise algorithms that would distinguish invalid clicks that are based on fi-aud 
(referred to "click fraud") and invalid clicks that are not. ER 755-58, 1389-90, 
1396, 1399. This is important because the former clicks are within the scope of 
Facebook's disclaimer for which Facebook has no liability and the latter ones are 
not. 
As Dr. Jakobsson opined, it is scientifically feasible to write rules and make 
click-validity determinations in the same manner that Facebook does, except that 
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the new rules would have different parameters for determining click validity. Thus, 
the district court's summary rejection ignored that Facebook itself performs this 
very exercise in determining whether a click is billable to an advertiser. The 
district court made the same error with respect to its conclusory statement that 
"false" positives preclude assessing damages on a class-wide basis. Id. To the 
extent that false positive may result in certain clicks being declared invalid that 
should have been declared valid, that is an issue that Facebook itself confronts in 
its pay-per-click platform. There is nothing in the record to suggest that false 
positive renders the methodology unreliable. Moreover, even if it did occur on an 
aberrational basis, it would not preclude the assessment of damages. See Marsu, 
B. l? v. The Walt Disney, Co., 185 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) ('"[Tlhe fact that 
the amount of damage may not be susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain, 
contingent or difficult of ascertainment does not bar recovery. '") (citation omitted). 
See also Svail v. Village of Lisle, 249 F.R.D. 544, 562 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (refusing to 
strike plaintiffs' expert's opinions at class certification; explaining that "although 
plaintiffs have not provided information on the potential or known rate of error of 
[the expert's] testing, the Court finds that [the expert's] report is both relevant and 
based on sufficiently reliable methodology and valid for the Court to consider it 
insofar as it bears on the analysis of class certification"). Here, the court again 
summarily concluded, without citation to any scientific body or analysis, that the 
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failure to predict the rate of false positives precluded its reliance on the expert 
opinions. The court erred. 
Finally, the damage calculation that Dr. Jakobsson proposes is a simple 
mathematical calculation that refunds to advertisers in an identical manner, if 
appropriate, monies paid for clicks that would have been deemed invalid under the 
modified rules. ER 1387, 1389-90. As the district court itself correctly noted, the 
need for individualized damages does not defeat class certification. ER 19. That is 
the case here, where those damages are straightforward and easily calculated. 
11. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS ARE INADEQUATE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES 
FAILS FOR MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS. 
In a brief alternative holding, the district court also concluded that the 
Plaintiffs would not be adequate class representatives because (i) they failed to 
show "concrete" injury, (ii) they might have to litigate individualized defenses, (iii) 
the proposed class is too diverse, and (iv) Plaintiff Fox supposedly knew nothing 
about the case. ER 9-10. None of these reasons finds support either in law or in 
fact. 
A. The Evidence Showed a Concrete Injury. 
The district court's holding that the Plaintiffs lack a "concrete" injury is an 
application to the Plaintiffs of its general holding that the class could not show 
injury and thus fails for the same reason. As already explained, Plaintiffs' expert 
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testified that his analysis of Plaintiffs' click data revealed that they were, in fact, 
charged for repetitive clicks. ER 1458-1462. That exhibit was introduced at this 
deposition and was the subject of Facebook's cross-examination. ER 1408-1430; 
1432-1454. The district court ignored this evidence. ER 10. 
B. Plaintiffs Were Not Subject to "Unique" Defenses. 
The district court's holding that Plaintiffs were subject to potential "unique" 
defenses-namely, whether they waived their breach of contract claims by failing 
to dispute invalid clicks within Facebook's prescribed time period-was clearly 
erroneous. ER 10. As Plaintiffs pointed out, that contractual provision was not 
even adopted until July 201 1-two years after the named plaintiffs they stopped 
advertising on Facebook. ER 83. 
In any case, the existence of a potential defense to a proposed class 
representative's claims is an impediment to certification only where it is "a unique 
defense that is likely to become a major focus of the litigation." Tourgeman v. 
Collins Fin. Sews., No. 08-CV-1392 JLS (NLS), 201 1 WL 5025152, at *12 (S.D. 
Cal. Oct. 21, 201 1) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
William v. Oberon Media, Inc., CV 09-8764-JFW AGRX, 2010 WL 8453723, *4- 
6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010), afd, 468 F. App'x 768 (9th Cir. 2012). That is not 
the case here. Facebook's putative waiver defense is not sui generis; nor is it one 
that would become a major focus of the litigation. Denial of class certification 
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based on possible applicability of defenses is appropriate where those defenses will 
"vary significantly among class members." Ritti v. U-Haul Int '1, Inc., No. 05 -4 1 82, 
2006 WL 11 17878, at "11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,2006). 
C. Diversity is not a Factor Under Rule 23(a). 
The district court's view that the class was too diverse also was not a 
legitimate basis to find Plaintiffs inadequate. The four factors used to consider 
adequacy are the (1) qualifications of the proposed representative's counsel; (2) 
absence of interests antagonistic to those of absent class members; (3) shared 
interests between representatives and absent class members; and (4) likelihood that 
the suit is collusive. Molslzi v. Gleich, 3 18 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir. 2003). Diversity 
of the class is not one of the factors. Furthermore, here too, the district court's 
finding in this respect was internally inconsistent with its conclusion that Plaintiffs' 
claims were typical of those of absent class members. ER 9. 
D. Fox Had Sufficient Knowledge of the Case. 
Just as untenable was the district court's finding that Plaintiff Fox was 
inadequate because "he knows essentially nothing about the case." ER 10-1 1. Most 
courts in this Circuit have found the plaintiffs knowledge about the case to be 
irrelevant for adequacy purposes. See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 
F.R.D. 98, 120 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (noting court's inability to locate "any Ninth 
Circuit decision imposing such a [knowledge] requirement"). The few that have 
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considered it germane have held that it presents a low threshold. See, e.g., Moellev 
v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 6 1 1 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (proposed representative 
"will be deemed inadequate only if she is 'startlingly unfamiliar' with the case"); 
Biancur v. Hickey, No. C-95-2145, 1997 WL 9857, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1997) 
(same); see also Latuga v. Hootevs, Inc., No. C 93-7709, 1996 WL 164427, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1996) (proposed representative need only have "some 
commitment to the case," and "need not immerse himself in the case. The modern 
trend is to require little in the way of factual knowledge on the part of the class 
representative. Generally, where a proposed representative demonstrates a 
familiarity with the action's outlines, he or she will be deemed adequate.") (citing 
cases). 
The evidence before the district court showed that Plaintiff Fox fully 
understood the crux of the case: he was being overcharged for advertising by 
Facebook and specifically for clicks for which he should not have been charged. 
He testified, that on behalf of Fox Test Prep, he was "alleging that Facebook 
charged [him] for invalid clicks" and that he had been "charged for things [h]e 
should not have been charged for"; understood that fraudulent clicks were not the 
subject of his claims; also understood that he was acting on behalf of other 
advertisers and his obligations as a class representative; would periodically confer 
with counsel on behalf of the class to understand what is going on in the case; and 
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was prepared to testify at trial. ER 61-64. See In re Conseco Life Insur. Mktg. 
Litig., 270 F.R.D. 529, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the plaintiffs' 
general familiarity with the allegations and duties as a class representative 
sufficient to establish adequacy). Thus, the district court's statement that 
Plaintiff Fox knows "nothing" about the case is without support in the record. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the district court's denial of class certification and 
remand this action with instructions to certify the proposed class. 
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